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WALKING ON THIN ICE: DOES THE REVENUE 
PROCEDURE 2013-13 SIGNIFY THE DEMISE OF 
LEVERAGED SPIN-OFFS? 
NATALIA CARUSO* 
ABSTRACT 
Corporate taxpayers, when weighing leveraged spin-off transactions, 
have long relied on the comfort of Internal Revenue Service rulings to 
“bless” the deals. These transactions, when structured properly, are not sub-
ject to tax under section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) and 
can potentially provide great monetizing opportunities to public companies. 
Recent developments in the Internal Revenue Service’s ruling policy, how-
ever, removed the safety blanket companies had relied upon, as the Internal 
Revenue Service announced its decision to cease the issuance of the rulings 
addressing the deals’ qualification for tax-free treatment. 
This Note will examine the history and the complex anatomy of leveraged 
spin-offs and provide an analysis of conflicting views on nonrecognition 
treatment afforded to the transactions. It will seek to shed light on the com-
plexities involved in the structuring of the transaction and I.R.C.’s current 
inability to effectively eliminate them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1986, after the Tax Reform Act repealed General Utilities & Operat-
ing Co. v. Helvering,1 spin-off transactions under section 355 of the tax code2 
became one of the only ways a corporation could avoid the corporate tax on 
distribution of its appreciated property.3 Section 355 was designed to per-
mit a tax-free division of a single corporation into two or more corporations 
when certain requirements were met,4 on the theory that the division is 
merely a change in the form of an enterprise that continues to be owned by 
the same shareholders.5 The driving idea behind the tax-free provision was 
to promote economic growth and encourage companies in extremely com-
petitive markets to improve productivity without burdening businesses with 
recognition of taxable gain on the transaction.6 
When a complex tax-free spin-off transaction is structured properly, 
the Internal Revenue Service (“the Service”) will respect its form.7 However, 
many tax practitioners, as well as the Service itself, and tax-policymakers, 
believe that corporate taxpayers engage in structuring transactions, otherwise 
taxable, as tax-free reorganizations, thus manipulating one of the last re-
maining tax advantages of corporate restructuring.8 For instance, in a spin-off 
                                                                                                                         
1 296 U.S. 200 (1935). The Supreme Court held that corporations could distribute ap-
preciated property to their shareholders tax-free. See id. at 206. 
2 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code. 
3 Liz Hoffman, Companies to Lose IRS Blessing On Spinoffs, LAW360 (Oct. 5, 
2014, 11:31 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/454078/companies-to-lose-irs-bless 
ing-on -spinoffs, archived at http://perma.cc/R9ST-3CNG. 
4 See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(b) (1954). 
5 See STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE TAXATION 
789 (4th ed. 2008). 
6 See H.R. Rep No. 1337, at 1–2 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4025; 
see also STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 516 (4th 
ed. 1997) (describing how Congress intended section 355 to provide corporations with a 
tax-free mechanism to achieve a division divestiture that would be economically wise to 
undertake except for the prohibitive tax cost that would otherwise be incurred on a sale of 
that division). 
7 See Alison Bennett, IRS Encouraging Discussion on Section 355 Deals No-Ruling 
List, BNA MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS L. REP. NO.16, at 350 (2013). 
8 See generally id. (providing that according to Amie Colwell Breslow, an attorney in 
IRS Branch 4, one reason for the No-Rule policy is that it “became known” that there is 
“something special” under tax code section 355); Debra J. Bennett, Obtaining Value from 
an Investment in a Controlled Corporation, 89 TAXES 12, at 9 (2011) (summarizing 
various section 355 monetizing techniques); see also Deborah L. Paul, Spin-Offs, Leverage 
and Value Extraction—A Spin by Any Other Name ..., 91 TAXES 99, 3, at 99–101 (Mar. 
2013) (arguing that current law relating to leverage and value extraction in section 355 
transactions is form driven, and true reform of the law in this area would require upending 
concepts such as the identity of the transferor and the realization requirement). 
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transaction involving securities-for-debt exchange (a leveraged spin-off 
transaction), a parent corporation uses securities of the controlled corpora-
tion (its subsidiary) to pay off the parent’s debt, which had been outstand-
ing for some minimum period,9 and subsequently distributes (“spins-off”) 
the controlled corporation to its shareholders in a tax-free section 355 trans-
action.10 Although the Service had generally tolerated such reorganiza-
tions, parent corporations “used this technique to raise cash to be retained 
by the parent” itself—which monetized the transaction.11 The Service’s 
approval of recent leveraged spin-off transactions despite extremely short 
redemption periods of the newly issued debt by the parent corporation where 
the “debt is born only to die”12 further revealed possibilities for extracting 
capital from a subsidiary before spinning it off tax-free.13 
Spin-off transactions are complex, and the potential tax exposures 
from such transactions that fail to satisfy the requirements for qualification 
under section 355 can be devastating to the parent corporation and its 
shareholders.14 Accordingly, when considering leveraged spin-off transac-
tions, public companies long relied on the comfort of the Service’s private 
letter rulings to bless deals.15 Historically, private letter rulings could ad-
dress the entirety of the spin-off transaction, reviewing all of the tax con-
sequences, and providing the Service’s standing on whether the transaction 
                                                                                                                         
9 See Paul, supra note 8, at 104. 
10 Debt-for-debt exchanges allow the parent corporation to exchange certain types of 
debt securities of the controlled corporation for the parent’s outstanding debt without 
regard to the tax basis of the assets of the controlled entity. See discussion infra Part II. 
There have been various legislative proposals in recent years that generally would have, 
if enacted, limited this flexibility to engage in debt-for-debt exchanges where the amount 
of Controlled debt securities exceeds the tax basis of the controlled corporation’s assets. 
See Matthew A. Rosen & Thomas F. Wood, New IRS Policies and the Future of Tax-Free 
Spin-Off and Split-Off Transactions, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, at 
4 (Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.skadden.com/insights/new-section-355-no-rule-policies, 
archived at http://perma.cc/UR4T-RKUQ. 
11 Jasper L. (Jack) Cummings & Edward Tanenbaum, Section 355 No-Rule Tightened, 
ALSTON & BIRD TAX BLOG, at 2 (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.alston.com/taxblog/?entry 
=4775, archived at http://perma.cc/5U8F-Z22M [hereinafter Cummings & Tanenbaum]. 
12 Amy S. Elliott, ABA Meeting: Practitioners Consider How Current Code Distorts 
Leveraged Spinoff Decisions, 2012 TNT 220-5, 224 (Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Elliott, 
ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off] (citing Deborah L. Paul of Wachtell, 
Lipton, Rosen & Katz). 
13 See id.; see also Robert Rizzi, IRS Opens the Gates: Sara Lee’s Spinoff Ruling, 40 
J. CORP. TAX’N 24, 24 (2013) [hereinafter Rizzi, IRS Opens the Gates]. 
14 Karen G. Sowell & Shane Kiggen, Role of the Step Transaction Doctrine in Section 
355 Stock Distributions: Control Requirement and North-South Transaction, N.Y. ST. B. 
ASS’N TAX SEC. REP. 1292, at 2 (Nov. 5, 2013). 
15 See Hoffman, supra note 3. 
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qualifies for tax-free treatment.16 The government, however, tweaked this 
benign practice by removing the safety blanket previously available to corpo-
rate taxpayers through issuance of Revenue Procedure 2013-317 in January 
of 2013. The Procedure is widely known as the 2013 No-Rule policy and 
provides a list of areas in which the Service no longer will issue private 
letter rulings.18 Specifically, the 2013 No-Rule policy announced that the 
Service would no longer issue rulings as to whether a debt-for-debt exchange 
in connection with a leveraged spin-off transaction is tax-free where new 
debt of the distributing corporation is issued as part of the transaction.19 
On June 25, 2013, the Service expanded its No-Rule policy with respect 
to spin-offs through issuing Revenue Ruling 2013-32, which provides that 
the Service will no longer rule on whether leveraged spin-offs qualify for 
tax-free treatment, but instead will rule only on significant issues presented in 
such cases.20 The Service’s decision to expand its No-Rule policy will 
likely have the most significant impact on public spin-offs as section 355 
transactions involving debt-for-debt exchanges are going to be subject to 
increased complexity and uncertainty.21 The restrictive policy outlined in 
this Procedure will apply to all letter-ruling requests received after August 
23, 2013 and from that point, as the result of the change in the ruling policy, 
corporate taxpayers wishing to proceed with the leveraged spin-off trans-
actions will have to rely solely on the opinion of the counsel.22 
Part I of this Note will give a historical perspective and the policy be-
hind section 355. Part II will discuss the operation of section 355 in the 
context of leveraged spin-offs and, specifically, the treatment of those 
transactions by the Service prior to the issuance of Revenue Rulings in 
2013. Part II will also discuss the divide amongst tax practitioners on the 
tax-free treatment afforded to leveraged spin-off transactions. Part III will 
compare the opinions by tax practitioners who view the transaction as purely 
tax-motivated with those that find compelling policy reasons to permit 
                                                                                                                         
16 See Sowell & Kiggen, supra note 14. 
17 Rev. Proc. 2013-3, 2013-1 I.R.B. 113. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 See Rev. Proc. 2013-32, 2013-28 I.R.B. 55, 56. See also IRS Limits Rulings to 
“Significant Issues” in Certain Corporate Transactions, 119 J. TAX’N 4 (2013); Guid-
ance Restricts Scope of Corporate Letter Rulings on Issues Involving Nonrecognition 
Provisions, 72 TAX PRAC. 519, § 4 (July 8, 2013). 
21 See Thomas R. May & Reza Nader, IRS Significantly Expands “No-Rule” Policy for 
Spin-Offs and Other Corporate Transactions, BAKER & MCKENZIE, at 3 (July 15, 2013), 
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Publication/6c64895c-80eb-46e0-a037-5419005e2053 
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e377f83e-61f2-4fdd-bb75-ca5bbde03620/al_tax_irs 
corporatetransactions_jul13.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UE8Q-DBLL. 
22 See id. at 1, 3, 4. 
692 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:687 
flexibility in the structuring of corporate division. Finally, Part IV will 
discuss the most recent development in the Service’s treatment of the 
transactions and will address the recent No-Rule policy. 
I. HISTORY AND POLICY UNDERLYING SECTION 355 SPIN-OFFS 
A spin-off is one of the most common types of tax-free corporate divi-
sions permitted under section 355 of the I.R.C.23 In a spin-off transaction, 
a parent corporation forms and contributes some of its assets to a new 
corporation, a subsidiary.24 It then distributes the stock of this newly formed 
corporation to its shareholders on a pro-rata basis with each shareholder 
emerging as the result of the transaction as an equal owner in each corpo-
ration.25 Because a spin-off transaction involves a distribution of a parent 
corporation’s property—the subsidiary’s stock—to shareholders without 
the surrender of any of their stock in the parent company, the transaction 
resembles a dividend.26 
The tax law provided for tax-free treatment of certain forms of corporate 
separations since the enactment of the first corporate reorganization provi-
sions in the Revenue Act of 1918.27 The spin-off transactions, however, 
were not included within the reorganization provisions until the enactment 
of the Revenue Act of 1924.28 When spin-offs were originally introduced, 
                                                                                                                         
23 See generally I.R.C. § 355 (describing, in numerous subsections, a spin-off using 
the terms “distributing corporation” and “controlled corporation” instead of the lay terms 
parent and subsidiary). 
24 See STEPHEN SCHWARZ & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE TAXATION 817 (5th ed. 2012). 
25 Id. An example of a spin-off would be a corporation (C) that operates two businesses: 
chicken ranch and winery. See id. A and B are equal and the only shareholders of C. See 
id. C transfers all of the chicken ranch assets to a newly formed subsidiary (S), and then 
distributes S’s stock pro-rata to A and B. See id. Immediately after the distribution, the 
same two shareholders, A and B, own the two businesses’ operations in the same propor-
tions as before, only now the businesses are contained in two separate entities rather than 
as divisions of one corporate entity. See id. 
26 Id. Dividends are distributions of property by a corporation to its shareholders due 
to their ownership of corporate stock. Id. at 524. Although dividends commonly are paid 
in cash, they may also take a form of stock in a corporation owned by a parent company 
and generally must be included in the recipient gross income. I.R.C. § 301(c)(1). 
27 Section 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 provided for nonrecognition of gain or 
loss “when in connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a corpora-
tion a person receives in place of stock or securities owned by him new stock or securities 
of no greater aggregate par or face value.” Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 
1061 (1919). 
28 Section 203(c) of the Revenue Act of 1924 provided that if there was a distribution of 
stock or securities to a shareholder pursuant to a plan of reorganization without the surrender 
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the purpose was to permit tax-free separation of one or more active busi-
nesses formally operated by a corporation.29 However, the poorly constructed 
statute provided taxpayers with a convenient opportunity to distribute 
assets from a corporate solution without incurring a shareholder-level 
dividend tax and escaping dividend income. For example, a corporation 
could transfer its assets to the newly created subsidiary, distribute the stock of 
the subsidiary to the parent-company shareholders, and then liquidate the 
subsidiary so the shareholders could obtain the assets. Upon liquidation of 
the subsidiary, the shareholders would be taxed at capital gains rate rather 
than ordinary income;30 thus, the shareholders effectively could utilize the 
spin-off provisions to convert ordinary income from dividends into capital 
gains treatment.31 This statutory blanket exemption from the tax on dividend 
income remained available until the landmark case Gregory v. Helvering32 
promulgated the business purpose test.33 
Even before Gregory reached the Supreme Court, in light of staggering 
concerns that businesses were being spun off solely for tax-avoidance 
purposes, Congress rescinded the tax-free treatment formerly accorded to 
                                                                                                                         
of stock or securities by the shareholder, no gain would be recognized by the shareholder 
from the receipt of stock. Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 253, 256–57 (1924). 
29 House Comm. on Ways and Means, Internal Revenue Bill of 1921, H.R. Rep. No. 350, 
67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10–12 (1921), reprinted in 95 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1909–1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 
(Bernard D. Reams ed., 1979). 
30 Taxpayers paid 46 percent taxes for dividends at the highest tax rate, while capital 
gains were taxed only at 12.5 percent. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, §§ 210, 
211, 214, 43 Stat. 253, 264–71 (1924) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 210, 211, 214 (1924)). See 
also Karim H. Hanafy, Section 355 Spin-Off + Section 368 Reorganization [Not Equal 
to] Section 355(e). It’s Simple Math: The Anti-Morris Trust Bill Simply Does Not Add 
Up, 1 H. BUS. & TAX L.J. 119, 123 n.18 (2001). 
31 See discussion infra note 32. 
32 293 U.S. 465 (1935). In Gregory, the taxpayer owned all of the stock of a corpora-
tion, which in turn owned certain securities the taxpayer wished to sell. Id. at 467. Rather 
than distributing these securities as taxable dividend, the taxpayer caused the corporation 
to transfer the securities to a newly formed corporation in exchange for its stock and then 
distribute such stock to the taxpayer. Id. The taxpayer asserted that the described transac-
tions qualified as a divisive reorganization, even though three days after receiving the 
stock she liquidated the newly formed corporation to get hold of the securities, and re-
ported a capital gain on the liquidation. Id. The Board of Tax Appeals agreed based on 
the fact that the transaction fully complied with the literal language of the reorganization 
provisions. Id. at 468. The Second Circuit in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d 
Cir. 1934), and the Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935), both 
reversed with the latter basing its decision on the theory that the transaction was a “mere 
device” for bailing out Distributing’s earnings and profits at capital gain rates, not a gen-
uine business-motivated restructuring as contemplated by the reorganization provision. 
33 See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469. 
694 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:687 
spin-offs.34 After several proposals to reinstate the spin-off as a vehicle for 
tax-free reorganizations, Congress finally amended the Code in 195135 to 
provide for a tax-free spin-off, taking the position that it was “economically 
unsound to impede spin-offs which break up businesses into a greater number 
of enterprises, when undertaken for legitimate business purposes.”36 How-
ever, Congress incorporated the device test to deter tax avoidance practices,37 
which was finally replaced three years later by section 355, in substantially its 
current form.38 
There were no significant legislative changes to section 355 for thirty 
years until the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine39 by the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986.40 The General Utilities doctrine provided that a corporation 
generally could distribute appreciated property41 to its shareholders with-
out recognizing any income at the corporate level.42 Congress repealed the 
doctrine by imposing a corporate level tax on the distribution of appreciated 
property to shareholders, as if the corporation had sold such property for 
its fair market value.43 After the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, sec-
tion 355 became “the most significant remaining statutory exception”44 to the 
rule that all corporate distributions of appreciated property are subject to 
                                                                                                                         
34 See Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, 48 Stat. 680. 
35 Compare id., with Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 317, 65 Stat. 452, 
493 (1951). 
36 S. REP. NO. 82-781, 2029 (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 2019. 
37 To cure the infirmities revealed by Gregory, the Act subjected spin-off transactions 
to section 39.112(b)(11), under which a spin-off was presumed to be tax-free unless it 
appeared that a corporation that was a party to a reorganization “was not intended to 
continue the active conduct of a trade or business after such a reorganization or ... the 
corporation whose stock [was] distributed was used principally as a device for the distri-
bution of earnings and profits to shareholders.” I.R.C. § 39.112(b)(11) (1954). 
38 See Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 355(b), 68A Stat. 114 (1954); see 
also Donald F. Bronson, Spin-Offs Before and After the Tax Reform Act, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 
157, 162 (1990) (stating the requirements of the section generally resembled those placed 
on corporations since Gregory, with the objective to prevent the use of spin-offs as a 
means of converting shareholder-level dividend income into capital gain). 
39 See General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 206 (1935). The 
doctrine had been codified under section 311(a)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1954. See 
SCHWARZ & LATHROPE, supra note 24, at 541. 
40 See Pub. L. No. 99-514 §§ 631–33, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified in I.R.C. §§ 311, 336, 337). 
41 Appreciated property is property that has a fair market value in excess of its basis. 
See I.R.C. § 311(b)(1)(B). Property’s basis is its cost. I.R.C. § 1012. 
42 See General Utilities, 296 U.S. at 206. 
43 See I.R.C. § 311(b). 
44 John R. Wilson, A New Spin on Corporate Spin-offs: Rev. Proc. 96-30, 25 CORP. 
LAW. 109, 111 n.1 (1996). 
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double taxation.45 Retaining the tax-free principle as its core, section 355 
has been the primary means of effecting spin-off transactions.46 
Naturally, Congress feared that after 1986 “tax-free spin-offs could be 
utilized as an escape hatch to distribute appreciated property ... out of corpo-
rate solution tax-free.”47 In response to this concern, in the following years, 
Congress amended section 355 to deny tax-free treatment when share-
holders or the parent corporation itself has acquired control of the subsidi-
ary during the five-year period preceding the spin-off.48 The section was 
further revised to render certain distribution taxable to distributing corpo-
ration49 so as to capture all of the transactions it intended to prevent. 
II. MECHANICS OF LEVERAGED SPIN-OFFS 
As discussed in Part I of this Note, section 355 generally permits a corpo-
ration to distribute appreciated stock of a subsidiary corporation to its 
shareholders without triggering any gain at either the corporate or share-
holder level if the transaction meets an intricate set of statutory and judicial 
requirements.50 The fundamental tax policy principle underlying tax-free 
treatment of spin-offs is that the division is “merely a change in the form 
of an enterprise that continues to be owned by the same shareholders.”51 
While current law does impose constraints, depending on how the spin-off 
                                                                                                                         
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 109. In the absence of section 355, if the fair market value of a subsidiary’s 
stock were to exceed the adjusted basis in the hands of a parent corporation, section 
311(b) would require that the parent recognize a gain equivalent to the appreciation of the 
distributed stock. I.R.C. § 311(b). In addition, the shareholders of the parent corporation 
would have to include in their income the fair market value of the stock, which would be 
taxable as a dividend. § 301. Section 355, however, steps in to provide that no gain or loss 
will be recognized by the shareholder of a corporation who receives stock of the corpo-
rate subsidiary, so long as the transaction meets certain conditions. § 355(a). Thus, the tax 
on such distribution would be completely deferred until the shareholders sell the stock. 
On receipt of the stock, the shareholders take a carryover basis under section 368(a), and 
they would be subject to only one level of tax, at capital gain rates, upon disposition. 
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D), (2)(H)(ii). 
47 Hanafy, supra note 30, at 125. 
48 I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(D). 
49 I.R.C. § 355(d)(2)(A)–(B). Section 355(d) applies where a person purchases stock 
of a parent corporation within five years preceding the spin-off of a corporate subsidiary, 
and such stock either: (1) represents 50 percent or more of the parent’s outstanding stock 
after the spin-off, or (2) results in the purchaser receiving 50 percent or more of the out-
standing subsidiary’s stock in the spin-off. Id. 
50 See I.R.C. § 355. 
51 Jeffrey M. Trinklein & Kathryn A. Kelly, Overview of US Corporate Taxation in 
2012–2013, in CORPORATE TAX 188 (William Watson ed., Global Legal Group 2013) 
(citing to various subsections of I.R.C. § 355). 
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is structured,52 taxpayers often may extract value from the controlled sub-
sidiary by utilizing permissible alternative transactions.53 For example, if a 
subsidiary transfers cash to the parent corporation, the cash is tax-free only 
to the extent of the parent’s tax basis in the controlled subsidiary;54 on the 
other hand, debt securities can be distributed tax-free without the same 
basis limitation.55 
Absent basis limitation, leveraged spin-off transactions generally provide 
the most beneficial results to taxpayers.56 In the typical leveraged spin-off, 
a subsidiary issues its debt securities to the parent corporation57 and the 
parent corporation then exchanges those debt securities with the parent’s debt 
holders for its own debt.58 For example, the parent corporation issues 
short-term debt to a lender (e.g., an investment bank) in exchange for cash 
and subsequently transfers some assets to its subsidiary in exchange for 
subsidiary’s stock or securities.59 The parent corporation then retires incre-
mental amounts of its newly issued debt by exchanging it with the lender 
for the subsidiary’s stock or securities.60 At the same time, the parent cor-
poration distributes the remaining subsidiary’s stock or securities to the 
parent’s shareholders in a tax-free section 355 spin-off. 61 Ultimately, the 
                                                                                                                         
52 To qualify as a tax-free spin-off under section 355, a corporate division must satisfy a 
number of statutory requirements: A parent corporation must control the stock or securi-
ties of a subsidiary immediately prior to spin-off, and it also must distribute all of the 
subsidiary’s stock or securities or an amount of stock sufficient to constitute control. 
I.R.C. §§ 355(a)(1)(A), (D). The “control” requirement is defined as an ownership of 80 
percent of the total combined voting power and 80 percent of the total number of shares 
of all classes of stock. § 368(c). Furthermore, both the parent corporation and subsidiary 
must be engaged immediately after the spin-off in an actively conducted trade or business, 
which has been so conducted throughout the five-year period ending on the date of the 
spin-off. §§ 355(a)(1)(C), (b). The spin-off transaction may not be used “principally as a 
device for the distribution of the earnings and profits” of either the parent or subsidiary. 
§ 355(a)(1)(B). In addition to statutory tests, a spin-off transaction must satisfy judicially 
created limitations: first, nonrecognition is available only if the distribution is carried out 
for an independent corporate business purpose, Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (2011); second, 
the shareholders prior to the spin maintain adequate continuity of interest in both the 
parent and subsidiary; and third, the continuity of business enterprise is maintained after 
the spin. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.355-1(b), 1.355-2(c) (2011). 
53 See Paul, supra note 8, at 104. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See Trinklein & Kelly, supra note 51, at 189. 
58 Id. 
59 Amy Chapman, IRS Issues “No-Rule” Order on Several Section 355 Transactions, 
KPMG REPORT, at 4 (June 17, 2013), http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights 
/ArticlesPublications/taxnewsflash/Documents/061713-no-rule-355.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/43CR-778U. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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parent corporation retains the cash from the debt issuance while its related 
debt has been retired using the subsidiary’s securities. 
No basis limitation is imposed on the parent’s receipt of the subsidiary’s 
securities regardless of what the basis of the parent corporation in the sub-
sidiary’s assets is.62 Accordingly, the parent corporation is able to extract 
value from its subsidiary to the extent that its newly issued debt exceeds the 
subsidiary’s assets basis, in circumstances that would otherwise trigger the 
recognition of gain to the parent.63 
Because of the inherently difficult nature of the leveraged spin-off trans-
actions and careful tax planning involved, the Service, until recently, has 
been willing to provide the corporate taxpayers and their advisors with some 
guidance in the form of private letter rulings formulating the Service’s stand 
on a particular transaction.64 Numerous private rulings have approved 
leveraged spin-off structure.65 At the beginning, the Service issued such rul-
ings only when the debt of the parent corporation that was exchanged for 
the subsidiary’s debt was historic debt, not incurred as part of the transac-
tion, and only when the parent corporation did not increase its debt in con-
templation of the transaction “other than in the ordinary course of its business 
as necessary to meet its working capital and similar needs.”66 As a practi-
cal matter, however, holders of the historic debt could well be reluctant to 
swap the parent’s debt for the debt of the subsidiary—such debt generally 
would involve a different issuer in a different business and terms of ma-
turity, interest rate, and other characteristics that are different from those 
of the parent’s debt.67 In light of these concerns, a practice emerged for a 
“friendly” investment bank to purchase the parent’s historic debt from the 
existing holders and exchange it for the subsidiary’s debt.68 
                                                                                                                         
62 The parent corporation will not recognize gain or loss on the transfer of the subsidi-
ary’s stock or securities in exchange for the parent’s debt, provided that all conditions are 
satisfied. I.R.C. § 361(a). If the parent’s debt is a security and holders receive no “excess 
principal amount,” then the exchange is also tax-free to the parent’s debt holders. I.R.C. 
§ 355(a)(3)(A). 
63 Trinklein & Kelly, supra note 51, at 189. 
64 See discussion infra Part IV. 
65 See infra notes 67, 69. 
66 Chapman, supra note 59, at 4 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.382-9(d) (1994)). See also, e.g., 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-45-050 (Nov. 7, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-16-024 
(Apr. 20, 2007). 
67 See Paul, supra note 8, at 104. 
68 See id.; see, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-32-001 (Apr. 30, 2008) (step 5); I.R.S. 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-47-012 (Aug. 28, 2007) (step (6)); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-32-002 
(May 11, 2007). The Service permitted these transactions by referencing to a practice, 
which had evolved years earlier in the area of stock-for-debt exchanges under section 
108. See Gary B. Wilcox, Issuing Mixed Consideration in Troubled Debt Restructuring, 
10 VA. TAX REV. 357, 371–75 (1990). Prior to the enactment of section 108(e)(10) pur-
suant to the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 59, 98 Stat. 494 (1984), 
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Recent incarnations of the debt-for-debt exchange transactions which 
were approved by the Service—the so-called 5/14 Plans—involved scenarios 
in which the parent corporation issued short-term debt to an investment bank, 
in exchange for cash, for five days.69 The parent corporation and the bank 
then would enter into a debt-for-debt exchange agreement, under which they 
would agree in another eleven days to exchange the newly issued parent’s 
debt for the subsidiary’s securities, which the bank subsequently would sell in 
the market.70 The Service consistently concluded that such transactions will 
be allowed a tax-free treatment so long as the taxpayer represented that the 
parent corporation did not artificially increase its leverage in anticipation of 
the spin-off71 and the parties respected the five-day interval between the debt 
issuance and the entry into the exchange agreement, as well as the fourteen-
day interval between the debt issuance and the debt repurchase.72 The im-
portance placed upon the day-counting representations by the corporate 
                                                                                                                         
the issuance by a corporation of stock in exchange for its own debt generally did not 
result in cancellation of debt income. See id. Accordingly, a corporation that wanted to 
take advantage of this rule would issue stock to a friendly investment bank that had 
recently purchased the corporation’s debt from the existing third-party debt holders. See 
Paul, supra note 8, at 104. In response, by enacting section 108(e)(10), the Service re-
quired the investment bank to hold the debt for a period of time in order to demonstrate 
that they were true creditors. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-38-003 (May 22, 1987); I.R.S. 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-35-007 (May 18, 1987); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-35-006 (May 18, 
1987) (the bank’s acquisition of debt preceded execution of the exchange agreement by 
anywhere from three days to over four months). See also J. William Dantzler Jr., Spinoffs: 
Still Remarkably Tax Friendly, 129 TAX NOTES 683, 689 (2010), available at http://www 
.whitecase.com/files/Publication/86b9a23d-00ac-4550-b3c9-bb0b7ba20c9f/Presentation/Pub 
licationAttachment/0cab9161-7498-4074-994d-c43ad0b2aaf1/Article_Spinoffs_Still_Re 
markably_Tax_Friendly.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E537-SMLE (noting that the tech-
niques of the early 1980s, under which banks purchased the outstanding debt prior to any 
binding obligation to consummate the exchange, have been applied to spin-offs). 
69 See Trinklein & Kelly, supra note 51, at 189; see also Chapman, supra note 59. 
70 See Trinklein & Kelly, supra note 51, at 189. To obtain an approval from the Service 
for these types of transactions, corporate taxpayers would have to represent that the spin-
off would not take place until at least five days following the issuance of the parent’s 
debt, and that this newly issued debt would be held for at least fourteen days before the 
parent’s debt lenders were redeemed out for the subsidiary’s securities. See Rizzi, IRS 
Opens the Gates, supra note 13, at 26. 
71 Generally, taxpayers would be able to prove the legitimacy of the transaction by dem-
onstrating that the total amount of the debt exchanged in the transaction does not exceed 
the average amount of the parent’s debt outstanding in the previous year. See Elliott, ABA 
Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off, supra note 12; see also Robert Willens, 
Ralcorp’s Plans for Its Retained Post Shares Revealed in Ruling, 134 TAX NOTES 1273 
(2012), http://www.robertwillens.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/report.detail/articleID/f899110 
b-b85a-4d7e-b103-576360741f53. 
72 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2012-32-014 (Aug. 10, 2012); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-32-
009 (Aug. 12, 2011); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-29-005 (July 22, 2011); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 2010-32-017 (Aug. 13, 2010); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-02-009 (Jan. 11, 2008). 
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taxpayers reflects an attempt by the Service to test whether the parties to 
the transaction—the parent corporation, subsidiary, and debt lender(s)—
should be treated as bearing real economic risk, with the focus on whether 
the parent’s debt could be safely treated for tax purposes as actually 
“owned” by the debt lenders acting for their own account.73 
It appears then that in approving 5/14 Plan structures, the Service has 
applied a narrow version of the step transaction doctrine,74 which permits 
an integration or re-characterization of a series of separate transactional 
steps for federal income tax purposes “if the steps are closely related and 
undertaken with a view to a common objective.”75 Under a traditional step 
transaction doctrine analysis, the newly issued parent’s debt would not be 
respected generally if it is issued only to be subsequently redeemed.76 Ac-
cordingly then, one could argue that under the 5/14 Plan, although the agree-
ment with the lending bank to exchange debt is not entered into until five 
days after the issuance of the parent’s debt, the redemption of the debt 
may be viewed as the end result, and the issuance and redemption of the 
debt as mutually interdependent.77 This suggests the possibility of an ap-
plication of the step transaction doctrine to the 5/14 structures, under which 
the newly issued debt would not be respected.78 
The Service, however, seems to take the view that, because the debt lend-
ers subject themselves to the risks for fourteen days and there is no binding 
agreement to future exchange at the time the debt is issued since the exchange 
agreement is entered only five days after the issuance of the new debt, the 
step transaction doctrine would respect the debt.79 The readily apparent 
availability of these types of logical-on-their-surface arguments, however, 
lie at the heart of the disagreement among tax practitioners with respect to 
                                                                                                                         
73 See Rizzi, IRS Opens the Gates, supra note 13, at 26. 
74 See Paul, supra note 8, at 105. 
75 See Sowell & Kiggen, supra note 14, at 4. The step transaction doctrine is a judi-
cially created doctrine originating from a principal established and discussed in Part I of the 
case Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), which allowed the court to re-characterize a 
tax-motivated transaction. See Sowell & Kiggen, supra note 14, at 13. Where the doctrine 
applies to integrate a series of formally separate transactional steps, it operates to prevent the 
division of a single transaction into its parts in a manner that frustrates the purposes of a 
given Code provision. See Sowell & Kiggen, supra note 14, at 5. Additionally, the doctrine 
applies to re-characterize a transaction as a different, but economically equivalent, trans-
action, by ignoring the intervening stops in a multi-step transaction. Id. 
76 See Paul, supra note 8, at 105. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. Indeed, in Comm’r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968), the Supreme Court stated 
that in order for there to be a “first step” in a step transaction, “there must be a binding 
commitment to take the later steps.” 
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the tax-free treatment of the leveraged spin-offs,80 and perhaps, inflicted 
the recent No-Rule policy development.81 
III. DISAGREEMENT AMONG PRACTITIONERS 
The recent developments in the treatment of the leveraged spin-off 
transactions led to disagreements among practitioners about whether the 
taxpayer-favorable position taken by the Service in the 5/14 Plan rulings 
and other similar rulings dealing with corporate divisions were consistent 
with fundamental tax principles that would generally indicate taxable ex-
change treatment for these transactions.82 
At the root of the division among the practitioners’ views is the intri-
cate relationship between two fundamental tax policy principles.83 On one 
hand, the Code provided incentives for corporate restructurings by afford-
ing tax-free treatment for spin-offs and corporate reorganizations.84 On the 
other, the Code imposes tax where a taxpayer disposes of property and 
receives cash in excess of the taxpayer’s basis in such property.85 With 
this background in mind, some practitioners argue that the parent’s shift of 
debt to the subsidiary in excess of the parent’s basis is equivalent to the 
receipt of cash in excess of basis and thus is a squarely appropriate cir-
cumstance for imposition of tax.86 Accordingly, they argue, leveraged spin-
off transactions can be purely tax motivated.87 Those practitioners supporting 
the current tax-free treatment of the transactions counter that there are com-
pelling policy reasons to permit flexibility in the structuring of corporate 
divisions.88 This Note summarizes the reasoning of both groups below. 
A. Arguments Supporting the Tax-Free Treatment of Leveraged  
Spin-Off Transactions  
Strong arguments can be made in support of the current tax-free treat-
ment of the leveraged spin-off transactions.89 Despite the obvious tax benefits 
                                                                                                                         
80 See Paul, supra note 8, at 99. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 100. 
83 See Trinklein & Kelly, supra note 51, at 188. 
84 I.R.C. §§ 355, 368 (2012). 
85 I.R.C. § 1001 (2012). 
86 See infra Part III.B. 
87 See Paul, supra note 8, at 105; see also Elliott, ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Lever-
aged Spin-Off, supra note 12. 
88 See Elliott, ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off, supra note 12. 
89 See, e.g., Candace A. Ridgeway, Myths and Legends of “RMT” Spinoffs, 53 TAX 
MGM’T MEMO. 179, 180 (2012) (arguing that even spin-offs coupled with mergers represent 
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of spin-offs, numerous reasons indicate why companies pursue these trans-
actions, most of which are consistent with directors’ and officers’ fiduciary 
duty to maximize shareholder value and have nothing to do with federal tax-
ation.90 By virtue of the “business purpose” requirement,91 spin-offs always 
have a legitimate business purpose and stem from legitimate business con-
siderations rather than tax planning alone.92 In fact, many tax practitioners 
support the view that imposing a basis limitation on the amount of leverage 
that can be shifted to a subsidiary may interfere with the bona fide business 
and economic capital structure for the parent company and the corporation it 
controls.93 After all, as the parent company reduces its asset base, as an eco-
nomic matter, it should be able to shed some of the corporate group’s debt 
and business considerations, rather than the Code setting an artificial limit 
on the basis, and it should determine the amount of debt that is shifted.94 
Another strong argument supporting the current tax-free treatment of 
leveraged spin-off transactions is that, in line with the general policy behind 
                                                                                                                         
readjustments in structure that generally should be entitled to tax deferral); Neil J. Barr, 
Uncertainty Regarding the Tax Treatment of Liabilities in Divisive Reorgs Survives the 
AJCA, 105 TAX NOTES 1125, 1130 (2004) (arguing that where the parent corporation ex-
changes subsidiary’s securities for its own debt, the holders retain “a continuing economic 
interest in a historic distributing corporation’s business, which, under general principals is 
not the occasion for a recognition event”). 
90 See Edward S. Adams & Arijit Mukherji, Spin-Offs, Fiduciary Duty, and the Law, 
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 15, 16, 39 (1999) [hereinafter Adams & Mukherji]. 
91 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (2011). 
92 See Paul, supra note 8, at 101. 
93 See Amy S. Elliott, Practitioners Wary on Transportation Bill’s Anti Reverse Morris 
Trust Provision, 134 TAX NOTES 1371, 1372 (2012) [hereinafter Elliott, Practitioners 
Wary] (citing the view of a mergers and acquisition tax practitioner that the perception 
that taxpayers are using leverage to enable “a cashing out” fundamentally fails to appre-
ciate the economics of a separation and the policy of section 361 because a parent corpo-
ration must divide its debt between the parent and subsidiary in order to effectuate the 
distribution). “[T]here are policy reasons for the tax law to facilitate corporate separations 
when the two businesses have different capital structures.” See Elliott, ABA Meeting: 
Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off, supra note 12 (citing Thomas F. Wessel of KPMG LLP). 
94 See Elliott, ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off, supra note 12 (citing 
Thomas F. Wessel of KPMG LLP). Supporters of this view additionally refer to the fact 
that in enacting section 355(e), designed to prevent the avoidance of corporate tax on pre-
arranged sales of corporate stock, Congress avoided imposition of any additional re-
strictions on the amount or proportion of liabilities that could be shifted in connection 
with a spin-off transaction. See Robert A. Rizzi, Debt to Creditors: The Ongoing Debate 
Over Nonstock Payoffs in Spinoffs, J. CORP. TAX’N 18, 23 (2011) [hereinafter Rizzi, Debt 
to Creditors]. Thus, it appears that Congress avoided second-guessing allocations of in-
debtedness between and among parties to spin-off transactions presumably in part due to 
the fact that tax regulators were suspicious of imposing their own standards on the appro-
priate terms of commercial financial transactions, whether within a corporate family or 
between corporations and third-party lenders. Id. 
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section 355, the Code should not stand in the way of divisive transactions, 
which can make businesses smaller, more manageable, and, thus, more com-
petitive.95 Indeed, in a large industrialized society such as ours, it is bene-
ficial for corporations to disaggregate their assets without significant tax 
impediments, as the businesses’ larger sizes are not always optimal from 
the operational and capital structure perspectives.96 This is especially true 
in the context of publicly traded companies, which often desire to separate the 
parent and its subsidiaries so they each can devote their attention to a sin-
gle line of business.97 Indeed, a more narrowly focused company may have 
greater success and increased incentive for managers to perform due to its 
ability to devote more energy and attention to the single enterprise.98 Ac-
cordingly, one can argue that, based on these business considerations, the 
Code should promote divisive transactions99 just as it facilitates acquisi-
tive reorganizations.100 
Additionally, it is often the case that corporate parties use spin-off 
transactions as an integral part of acquisitive reorganizations with spin-off 
transactions being a first step in restructuring the relevant businesses so 
the acquisitive reorganization can occur.101 Retaining the tax-free treatment 
of the spin-offs then appears to be perfectly sensible in light of the Code’s 
general policy of facilitating acquisitive transactions.102 
The example of yet another argument supporting the current tax-free 
regime is based on the notion that spin-off transactions do not deplete the 
corporate tax basis, as no assets leave the corporate solution.103 In a spin-off 
transaction, income from the assets that both were transferred by the parent 
company to its subsidiary and remained in the parent company is still subject 
to the corporate-level tax, and thus it would be senseless to trigger gain 
                                                                                                                         
95 See Bennett, supra note 8. 
96 See Paul, supra note 8, at 101. 
97 See SCHWARZ & LATHROPE, supra note 24, at 819. 
98 Id. 
99 See Karla W. Simmon & Daniel L. Simmons, The Future of Section 355, 40 TAX 
NOTES 291, 293 (1988) (arguing that the degree to which the corporate shareholder’s re-
lationship to corporate assets is changed in the corporate “divorce” does not differ signif-
icantly from the change in the shareholders’ relationship to corporate assets in corporate 
“marriage,” thus the logic that supports the nonrecognition treatment in acquisitive reor-
ganizations should equally apply to divisive transactions). 
100 I.R.C. §§ 361(a), 368 (2012). 
101 See Paul, supra note 8, at 102. 
102 Id. (reasoning that such argument could be rationally entertained where the target 
business is separated from another business previously held under the same corporate 
umbrella in order to facilitate the consolidation of such target business with the acquirer, 
and both steps are motivated by an identical, genuine business rationale). 
103 “It isn’t a sale transaction but a new corporation with some of the same assets and 
all of the same shareholders ....” Elliott, ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off, 
supra note 12 (citing Matthew A. Rosen of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP). 
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recognition at the time of the spin-off.104 Accordingly, while the repeal of 
General Utilities stands for the proposition that gain should be recognized 
when assets leave corporate solution, the policy has been to disregard spin-
offs as proper occasion for recognizing gain.105 Similarly, in the context of 
leveraged spin-offs, to effect a distribution, the debt must be divided between 
a parent corporation and a subsidiary and debt transferred to the subsidiary 
in excess of basis merely represents a portion of the gain in the parent’s 
stock, which Congress did not intend to tax at the time of a spin-off.106 
B. Arguments Supporting the Taxation of Leveraged Spin-Off Transactions  
Corporate taxpayers favor a debt-for-debt exchange in the context of 
the leveraged spin-off transactions because section 355107 does not limit the 
amount of securities that the subsidiary can issue, or the amount of historic 
debt that the parent company can retire with the subsidiary’s securities.108 
Thus, the parent corporation can maximize the value it extracts from its 
subsidiary by utilizing a debt-for-debt exchange as part of a combination of 
monetization strategies.109 
Practitioners, however, disagree about whether the taxpayer-favorable 
position of the Service in the 5/14 Plan rulings, and in the similar rulings 
                                                                                                                         
104 See Paul, supra note 8, at 102. 
105 See, e.g., Robert A. Rizzi, The Fuss About Morris Trust: Spin-Off Transactions As 
Acquisition Techniques, 23 J. CORP. TAX’N 303, 306 (1997) [hereinafter Rizzi, Fuss About 
Morris Trust] (describing the view that the repeal of General Utilities “only means that 
gain should be recognized when corporate assets leave ‘corporate solution,’” because when 
assets remain in corporate solution, basis is preserved). 
106 See Elliott, Practitioners Wary, supra note 93 . 
107 In conjunction with section 368. 
108 I.R.C. §§ 361(b)(3), 357(c) (2012); see generally Robert Willens, Corporate Reor-
ganizations: Careful Negotiation of Rules Required in Retiring Debt in Connection with 
Spin Off, BNA DAILY TAX REP., at J-1 (July 7, 2008). But see Tax Reduction and Reform Act 
of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 3703 (2007) (proposal by Rep. Rangel, Chairman of 
the House Ways and Means Committee, to treat controlled securities as money or other 
property, which would limit the amount of controlled securities (and any other boot) to 
the basis in the assets that the parent company contributes to the subsidiary in the D reor-
ganization under section 368(a)(1)(D), a reorganization in which the parent corporation, 
after transferring substantially all of its assets to the subsidiary, completely liquidates); 
The American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. (2010) 
(proposal to treat debt securities issued by a controlled subsidiary in a divisive D reorga-
nization that exceed asset basis as triggering gain recognition). Eric Solomon, a former 
Treasury official, however, believes that such change in law would be an unwarranted ex-
tension of the section 357(c) policy, requiring recognition of gain where the liability to 
which contributed to a newly formed subsidiary property is subject exceeds the basis of all 
property contributed, because the stock basis of the controlled corporation disappears in 
section 355 distribution. See Amy S. Elliott, Extenders Proposal Targets Debt Securities 
Issues in Spinoffs, 2010 TNT 191-1 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
109 See Paul, supra note 8, at 104. 
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concerning leveraged spin-offs, is consistent with fundamental tax princi-
ples that would generally indicate taxable exchange treatment for such trans-
actions.110 Perhaps the strongest argument supporting the view that leveraged 
spin-offs can be purely tax motivated is that where the parent company 
shifts its debt to its subsidiary in excess of basis, it monetizes all or some 
part of its investment because such a transfer involves a disposition for cash 
in excess of basis—a straightforward case for recognition of gain.111 
Additionally, responding to the business purpose argument against cur-
rent taxation of the leveraged spin-offs, some practitioners argue that “the 
existence of a business purpose and the fact that economic pressures drive 
capital structure” and the proper imposition of tax are not mutually exclu-
sive events.112 Moreover, in response to the argument that the Code should 
facilitate divisive corporate restructurings, one may argue that promotion 
of “divorces” of the companies should not lead to giving a “free pass” when 
the parent company is cashing out as the result of the spin-off.113 
Responding in the same manner to the argument that all assets remain 
in the corporate solution, one can counter that if the Code were to include a 
concept aimed at affording tax-free treatment to the transaction between re-
lated corporations as long as assets remained in corporate domain, then sale 
transactions by a corporation to another corporation would not be taxed, con-
trary to the current law.114 Accordingly, where the parent company re-
ceives cash in excess of basis as the result of the spin-off transaction, the 
fact that assets do not leave the corporate domain should not prevent taxa-
tion of the transaction.115 
                                                                                                                         
110 See Elliott, ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off, supra note 12. 
111 See, e.g., Rizzi, Debt to Creditors, supra note 94, at 18 (arguing that where the parent 
company repays its debt with securities of its subsidiary, it improves its balance sheet on 
a pretax basis: “[The parent] is able indirectly to use assets with built-in gain, translated 
through the medium of [Subsidiary] debt securities, to monetize its investment without 
triggering tax”). In fact, some practitioners point out that the Service ought to impose a basis 
limitation on the leveraged spin-offs involving securities-for-debt exchanges. See Paul, 
supra note 8, at 100. Such an amendment would not be desirable for those who support 
the view that the Code should facilitate leverage shifts in spin-offs, as the imposition of 
basis limitation on the transactions would undermine corporate taxpayers’ abilities to 
achieve desirable capital structures for the parent company and the subsidiary. Id. 
112 See Paul, supra note 8, at 102 (pointing out that most sale transactions have a 
business purpose which does not preclude its taxable treatment). 
113 Id. 
114 “The Code does not view the corporate tax base as a whole as a single taxpayer such 
that assets may be moved around within it without triggering tax.” Paul, supra note 8. 
Each corporation is treated as a separate taxpayer and dispositions by a single corporation 
of appreciated assets is a recognition event, regardless of whether the assets remain in the 
corporate domain. I.R.C. §§ 11(a), 1001 (2012). 
115 See, e.g., Rizzi, Fuss About Morris Trust, supra note 105, at 305–06 (describing the 
view of many commentators and individuals in the Service and Treasury that “any movement 
of assets from the corporate owner, unless such movement falls within a specific statutory 
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One of the practitioners suggested that if lawmakers were to rewrite the 
law, they might consider one of four possible approaches to determining the 
result when the parent corporation received cash exceeding its basis in spin-
ning off the subsidiary: first, the alter ego theory, under which the spin-off 
is not taxable because both the parent company and subsidiary remain in 
corporate solution with essentially the same shareholders; second, the sale 
theory Variant One, under which the spin-off would be taxable if the parent 
company receives cash in excess of its basis in the subsidiary; third, the sale 
theory Variant Two, under which the spin-off would be taxable if there is a 
separate pool of assets combining with one of the two companies; and fourth, 
the sale theory Variant Three, under which the spin-off would be taxable if 
the parent company received cash in excess of its basis in the subsidiary and 
there is a separate pool of assets combining with the leveraged company.116 
Regardless of their consistency with each other, the Service has not embraced 
any of the approaches and none of them is reflected in the current law.117 
While the different views regarding the leveraged spin-offs were float-
ing around in the tax community for quite some time, the Service’s position 
on the tax-free treatment of the transactions remained intact provided the 
transactions were structured in a manner eligible for beneficial tax treat-
ment.118 Thus, the corporate taxpayers weighing tax-free spin-offs have long 
relied on comforting rulings from the Service.119 Recently, however, the 
Service announced significant limitations to its ruling policy with respect to 
spin-offs—the development that stumped many practitioners and left the 
companies more reliant on the judgment of tax advisors, rather than the 
blessings of regulators, when structuring deals as spin-offs.120 
IV. THE 2013 NO-RULE LIST: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
LEVERAGED SPIN-OFF TRANSACTIONS 
As discussed in Part II of this Note, many leveraged spin-off transac-
tions, especially in the public context, have proceeded on the basis of receiv-
ing a favorable letter ruling from the Service addressing the transactions’ 
qualifications under section 355.121 In January 2013, however, the Service 
                                                                                                                         
scheme, should trigger corporate-level gain” even if the assets do not leave corporate 
solution). See also Melissa C. McCann, Section 355 in a Post-General Utilities World: 
The Victim of an Overreaction?, 23 J. CORP. TAX’N 137, 158 (1996) (acknowledging that 
deferral is a tax benefit that should be available only in special circumstances). 
116 See Paul, supra note 8, at 103. 
117 See Elliott, ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin Off, supra note 12.  
118 See Hoffman, supra note 3. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 See discussion infra Part II. 
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announced significant limitations to its ruling policy with respect to spin-
offs by updating its so-called No-Rule policy—an annual revenue procedure 
listing the matters on which the Service will not issue private letter rul-
ings.122 The Revenue Procedure 2013-3 listed three new “areas under study in 
which rulings ... will not be issued until the Service resolves the issue 
through publication of a revenue ruling, a revenue procedure, regulation, 
or otherwise.”123 Specifically, the 2013 No-Rule List announced that the 
Service will no longer issue rulings concerning whether a debt-for-debt 
exchange in connection with a leveraged spin-off transaction is tax-free 
where new debt of the parent corporation is issued as part of the transac-
tion under the 5/14 Plan, or otherwise “in anticipation of the distribution.”124 
Although the announcement that the issue was under study did not 
change the tax-free treatment of leveraged spin-offs, to many tax practi-
tioners the news was significant as it signaled that the Service potentially 
viewed the transactions as problematic, causing great uncertainty regard-
ing their future treatment.125 Indeed, the comments from the Service’s 
officials addressing the ruling were not particularly comforting and sug-
gested that the limitations stem from the concerns discussed in Part III.126 
For example, one of the Service’s corporate counsels explained that the 
No-Rule announcement meant that the Service would be rethinking the 
transaction “pretty much from scratch” and that, as the result of the study, 
“[the Service] might come out in a different place” and is “not going to be 
bound by where [the Service was].”127 Similarly, another Service’s coun-
sel referred to the Service becoming aware of “something special” under 
section 355 as one of the reasons for the No-Rule policy.128 It appears that 
the Service’s identification of “something special” began with the increased 
                                                                                                                         
122 Rev. Proc. 2013-3, 2013-1 I.R.B. 113 (Jan. 2, 2013). 
123 Id. § 5. 
124 Id. § 5.01(10) of Rev. Proc. 2013-3 stated that Private Letter Rulings will not be 
issued on “[w]hether either § 355 or § 361 applies to a distributing corporation’s distribu-
tion of stock or securities of a controlled corporation in exchange for and in retirement of, 
any putative debt of the distributing corporation if such distributing corporation debt is 
issued in anticipation of the distribution.” 
125 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 3 (citing Steve Gordon’s comparison of the lever-
aged spin-off rulings to a security blanket absent which companies would hesitate to engage 
in the transaction); Cummings, supra note 11 (stating that the changes brought about by 
the 2013 No-Rule List are significant in that they can signal that the Service may think 
the transaction is problematic). 
126 See discussion infra Part III. 
127 See Amy S. Elliott, ABA Meeting: Practitioners Parse Implications of Expanded 
Corporate No-Rule Policy, 2013 TNT 19-1 (Jan. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Elliott, ABA Meeting: 
Expanded Corporate No-Rule Policy] (citing Mark Weiss, branch 6 attorney, IRS Office 
of Associate Chief Counsel (Corporate)). 
128 See Bennett, supra note 7. 
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interest of practitioners in the transaction.129 Both counsels admitted that, 
while the Service does not intend to provide a bright-line rule on what is 
considered “in anticipation of the distribution,” it will be “skeptical” of any 
debt issued at any time following a taxpayer’s announcement to do a spin-
off.130 To add to practitioners’ concerns, one of the counsels suggested 
that in structuring a leveraged spin-off transaction, the mere uncertainty on 
the part of a structuring counsel of whether issuance of debt falls within a 
broad definition of words “issued in anticipation of the distribution,” most 
likely means that, in fact, the debt was issued “in anticipation of the distri-
bution” and the transaction is within the scope of the No-Rule ruling.131 
Despite the concerns raised by the new No-Rule policy, the leveraged 
spin-off transactions that would fall within the scope of the ruling are not 
necessarily unworkable as lawyers may still be able to render opinions re-
garding their structure.132 Proceeding with a particularly complex leveraged 
spin-off transaction solely on the basis of a counsel’s opinion and without any 
significant input from the Service, however, is problematic and may cause 
companies’ hesitation in engaging in these transactions.133 In fact, the trend of 
a “chilling effect” on leveraged spin-off deals was noticed immediately 
after the ruling was issued.134 
The Service significantly expanded the No-Rule policy in June 2013 
when it issued a revenue procedure,135 which significantly restricted the 
circumstances under which the Service was willing to issue the rulings on 
whether a corporate separation satisfied the requirements for section 355 
tax-free treatment.136 The Service expressed that the purpose of this change 
was to conserve the Service’s resources137 though taxpayers could still seek 
a letter ruling if the corporate separation involved a “significant issue.”138 
                                                                                                                         
129 According to IRS Associate Chief Counsel William Alexander, if the transaction is 
“that interesting, then obviously that’s going to cause [the Service] to take another look at 
[it].” Elliott, ABA Meeting: Expanded Corporate No-Rule Policy, supra note 127. 
130 See Bennett, supra note 7. It is possible, however, that the Service would not con-
sider “old and cold” debt to be issued in anticipation of distribution. Id. 
131 See Elliott, ABA Meeting: Expanded Corporate No-Rule Policy, supra note 127 
(citing Mark Weiss). 
132 See id. 
133 According to one tax practitioner, “[o]pinion letters [from counsel] only get you so 
far, especially in an environment where companies are afraid of finding themselves on the 
front page of the Wall Street Journal for having a deal that’s challenged.” See Hoffman, 
supra note 3 (citing Gregory Kidder, a tax partner with Steptoe & Johnson LLP). 
134 Id. 
135 Rev. Proc. 2013-32, 2013-28 I.R.B. 55 (July 8, 2013). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at § 1. 
138 Id. § 2.01. The No-Rule ruling defined the term “significant issue” as an issue that 
is not clearly and adequately addressed by a statute, regulation, or other authority; the 
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By strengthening the standard under which the issuance of private letter 
rulings was allowed for section 355 transactions generally, the Service 
clarified when the taxpayers were still able to obtain a favorable ruling on 
certain crucial aspects of their corporate separations.139 The procedure, 
however, provided no such clarification regarding the issuance of the 
rulings on leveraged spin-off transactions and the effect of the No-Rule 
policy regarding those transactions has yet to be fully determined.140 The 
No-Rule policy changes for spin-off transactions were later incorporated 
in the Revenue Procedure 2014-3.141 Meanwhile, some practitioners logi-
cally suggest that the Service should consider issuing published guidance 
in areas relevant to leveraged spin-off transactions yet continue to rule 
privately, at least until taxpayers become more familiar with the published 
guidance standards.142 
CONCLUSION 
Proponents of leveraged spin-off transactions endorse their longevity 
because they promote economic efficiency and encourage expansion in an 
extremely competitive market.143 Opponents of the transactions disapprove of 
how inventive tax planners have wielded them to take appreciated assets out 
of a corporation tax-free.144 The changes brought about by the No-Rule 
policy are significant as they may signal that the Service thinks the trans-
action is problematic. Indeed, the changes reflect the first administrative cut 
back on the “burgeoning expansion” of section 355 as a preferred tax relief 
section in a long time.145 
There is much worry among practitioners surrounding the implication 
of the recent changes and the fact remains that the system is inefficient and 
                                                                                                                         
resolution of which is not essentially free from doubt; and that is legally significant and ger-
mane to determining the tax consequences of the transaction. Rev. Proc. 2013-3 § 3.01(41) 
(Jan. 2, 2013). The Revenue Procedure 2013-32 expanded the definition by eliminating the 
requirement that the issue be one that is not clearly and adequately addressed by the author-
ities but required the taxpayers to provide an analysis of relevant law most closely related to 
the issue and explain why these authorities do not resolve it. Rev. Proc. 2013-32 §§ 4.01(3), 
5.01(1) (July 8, 2013). 
139 Rev. Proc. 2013-32 §§ 4.01(3), 5.01(1) (July 8, 2013). 
140 See May & Nader, supra note 21. 
141 Rev. Proc. 2014-3 §3.01(45) (Jan 2, 2014). 
142 See Paul, supra note 8. Paul, citing to Revenue Procedure 2003-48, supports this argu-
ment by referring to the replacement of the Service’s historical practice of issuing private 
letter rulings determining whether a particular transaction satisfied the “business purpose” 
requirement, with a published guidance in 2003. Id. 
143 See Adams & Mukherji, supra note 90, at 16. 
144 See Paul, supra note 8, at 102–03. 
145 See Cummings & Tanenbaum, supra note 11. 
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uncertain because many of the rules are inherent in the Service’s ruling 
practice. Corporate taxpayers must incur the time and expense of seeking 
rulings for many transactions, because advisors applying traditional doc-
trine and analyses would not be able to provide the level of comfort the par-
ties seek. Under the circumstances, the tax world would be better off if the 
Service provided more guidance regarding the treatment of the leveraged 
spin-off transactions. 
  

